Malaysia's international image boasts harmonious multiculturalism amongst Malay, Chinese, Indian and Indigenous ethnolinguistic groups, alluring tourists and investors worldwide.
With that marketed image picture in mind, this paper takes a critical perspective of the international image of harmonious multiculturalism that Malaysia has created for itself by bringing that image face-to-face with Malaysia's domestic social polciies as they concern cultural and ethnic diversity. It then turns to critically investigate and analyse domestic politics of multiculturalism and multilingualism to reveal what appears to be an expanding fracture between Malaysia's international image and its domestic experiences. Drawing on critical multiculturalism, with its interdisciplinary interest in "structural analysis of unequal power relationships" (May & Sleeter 2010 :10) the paper shows that successive Malay-dominant governments have sought to regulate diversity in the interests of nation-building through an ethnocratic policy that favours the Malays. This, it is argued, is inconsistent with Malaysia's international image that exploits a western idea of multiculturalism and the ethnic and cultural egalitarianism it presupposes. The paper then argues that a renewed process of Islamisation in domestic politics amounts to moral monism (Parekh 2002) whereby Malay culture, religion and language are increasingly constructed as superior above those of Chinese, Indian and Indigenous Malaysians. This leads to the conclusion that the international image is especially an activity in political branding (Pasotti 2010) and that Malaysia may be diverting even further away from the multicultural and multilingual brand that Malaysia's international marketers have created and brought to television screens and newspapers worldwide.
In order to do this, the paper firstly sketches out Malaysia's ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity franca (Gill 2013) . The predominant language amongst the Malay has remained Bahasa Melayu.
Today, ethnicity and religion continue to be primary social markers and the main resource with which Malaysians self-identify (Gill 2005; Noor & Leong 2013) .
The international image
This diversity, parallel to Malaysia's recent and rapid economic development, has made for an appealing image sponsored by the Malaysian state for international tourism, and to a lesser degree international investment. The Malaysia.gov.my website is a public portal for official details about tourism and investment opportunities in Malaysia, from which the international image has been analysed for the purposes of this paper. The Malaysian Investment Development Authority (2015) refers to the country's political stability and rapid economic development to woo foreign investors, and describes the Malaysian workforce is marketed as young, vibrant, friendly, mobile, English speaking, and profiting from peaceful industrial relations. This image seems to have been appropriated by the private sector. For example, in its guide to those seeking to conduct business in Malaysia, Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2014) explains that Malaysia's government departments use English, that Indigenous Malay business is thriving, and that non-Malay medium schooling is welcome and abundant. Malaysia's Property Investment (2016) site similarly explains that "the society of Malaysia is multicultural. It has a mix of three races namely Malay, Chinese and Indian, living in exemplary harmony". The picture of Malaysia is one of a Western-leaning, English speaking, eagerly and successfully multicultural and multilingual nation.
However, the intersection of Malay, Indian and Chinese cultures, languages, and religions against a backdrop of white sandy beaches and exotic local foods, makes Malaysia attractive to foreign tourists. In 2014 Malaysia held its fourth Visit Malaysia Year with the express purpose to "reflect the diversity in unity of all Malaysians" (Tourism Malaysia, 2015a) . This seemingly celebrates Malaysia as a harmonious, unified, and potentially egalitarian multiculturalism. Since 1999, Tourism Malaysia has delivered the Malaysia, Truly Asia campaign, claiming "there is only one place where all the colours, flavours, sounds and sights of Asia come together" and that "this place is full of variety and this diversity extends to its cities, languages and landscapes as well" (Tourism Malaysia 2015) . This paints an alluring picture of ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity that makes Malaysia unique. The campaign has been so successful that it has been awarded successive marketing prizes (Tourism Malaysia, 2014 
A critical review of multicultural policy
With this in mind, we now position this international image of harmonious multiculturalism vis-à-vis domestic social policy to highlight a mismatch between the two. To do this, we draw from existing literature and primary government sources and critically reflect on how the Malaysian state has responded to domestic diversity. Before moving on to argue that a renewed Islamisation of Malaysian politics and society renders Malaysia's international image as even less realistic, this section shows that the authenticity of the image has long been at least dubious.
Upon securing independence in 1957 subsequent to the rise of Malay nationalism, a core policy task was to define and build the Malaysian nation in economic, social and linguistic terms.
Islam was regarded by Malays as an ideal foundation to the modern nation-state, as it is a religion of peace and tolerance that strives for inclusiveness (Benthall 2005 Malaysia, 1957) . However, as Albury and Aye (2016) explain, language and ethnicity are synonymous in Malaysia and the move to Bahasa Malaysia especially reflected Malay nationalist intentions. The state sought to see the "ascendancy of Malay politics, language and culture" (Pennycook 1994:195) above those of the Chinese and the Indian minority groups. As Bumiputera, the Malays came to consider themselves as deserving preferential rights and treatment vis-à-vis the Chinese and the Indians who continue to be discursively constructed as visitors, known as Pendatang, to Malaysia (Frith 2000) . Accordingly, the Malaysian constitution was drafted to reflect this special position of the Bumiputera above the other races, rather than foster political equality with Pendatang. Not only is Bahasa Malaysia the national language, but questioning its legislated supremacy amounts to sedition, as the hegemonic policy -intimately intertwined in Malaysia with race relations -is seen as inciting racial discord.
Like Bahasa Malaysia, Islam too was codified as defining modern Malaysia. The constitution stipulates that Islam is the religion of the federation, but this is parallel to provisions for freedom of religion at Article 11. This reflects a turbulent policy-making process whereby secularism and the role of Islam in the Constitution and in nation-building were subject to debate and negotiation between Malaysian political leaders, Islamic leaders, and British legal counsellors (Martinez 2001 (Martinez , 2004 The resulting ethnic tensions led to race riots in 1969. The Malay feared that their relatively lower socioeconomic standing would diminish Malay political control, and non-Malay feared they would be assimilated into a Malay identity (Noor & Leong 2013) . The resulting political response was to manage ethnic tensions by "expanding the interests of Malays as a dominant ethnic group rather mediating the interests of all ethnic communities" (Haque 2003:245) .
This was pursued by way of the 1971 New Economic Policy (NEP) which would give affirmative action to Malays -and Bumiputera more generally -by way of quotas for preferential access to housing, employment, education and share-ownership. As an economic policy it successfully established a Malay middle class (Fenton 2003) . From a sociological perspective, however, the NEP consolidated essentialised but hierarchised ethnic categorisation as the defining structure of Malaysian society. In itself, this essentialisation appears not to have been with rejected by Malaysians (Joseph 2003:171) . This would likely explain the stunted successes of Bangsa Malaysia, a policy programme from the 1990s that promoted a fabricated Malaysian race and promoted self-identification not on ethnic lines but as Malaysians (Ridge 2004 ).
However, opposition surfaced, especially in the Chinese and Indian communities, on the basis that affirmative action for the Malay disregarded those non-Malays who have welfare needs, and on the basis of inequality in accessing socioeconomic opportunities. Prime Minister Najib Razak's 1Malaysia policy would seek to rectify these inequalities to some degree by promoting multiculturalism, offering assistance on the basis of need, and instituting parity between the races in
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For example, the Malays still enjoy special quotas to employment, and any Malaysian who seeks entrance to a public university must pass a Bahasa Malaysia exam.
Despite this Malay-led diversity, multiculturalism has been popular as a term amongst Malaysian themselves when depicting their diversity (Guan 2011) and this has also been used to describe Malaysian society in academic terms borrowed from the West. However, the term multiculturalism in itself is not epistemologically benign, and Malaysia's Malay-dominant politics conceptualise cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diversity specifically in Malay, non-Western, sociohistorical terms.
Whereas western notions of multiculturalism lean towards concepts of democracy, equality, equity and social justice (Yow 2016) , the Malay political agenda sooner perceives its diversity as cultural pluralism (Fenton 2003) whereby different ethnicities and cultures co-exist but these differences need not be reconciled. Malay schools are not required to teach Islamic philosophy per se. Nonetheless, the mandatory history curriculum for all students at government schools includes instruction on Islamic civilisations and the technological advances in Islamic science. Schools are also prohibited from teaching Darwin's theory of natural evolution as this is deemed unIslamic (Joseph 2005) . That is to say, the morals and values of Islam permeate policy making.
While Islam has long played an important role in shaping Malaysian society, its influence has been increasing over the last decade including in interethnic domains. As Abbott and
Gregorios-Pippas (2010) explain, "from banking to law, from dress to education policy, almost no sector of Malaysian society has escaped the growing influence of Islam upon the socioeconomic and political make-up of the country" (p. 135). This is to say, Malaysia's earlier policies can be perceived as more western-leaning, but this has now given way to a stronger assertion of Islamic principles.
In terms of Malaysian politics, Liow (2003) to the polls in 2016, PAS declared that only a Muslim should be eligible to lead that state, albeit the largest single religious group in Sarawak is Christian (Ghazali, 2016) . While the PAS president claimed that "we accept Chinese and Indians as citizens, we treat everyone equally", he nonetheless
argued that "we just want to be advisers to the state government so that they will lead the state fairly and according to the principles of Islam" (ibid).
The country's successive Prime Ministers are well-known to draw on Islamic philosophy and ideals when addressing the heterogeneous Malaysian population. Ghazali's (2014) discourse analysis of Malaysian political speeches by the last three prime ministers, shows a notable shift from secular foundations to Islamisation. The current Prime Minister has even questioned the premises of international human rights framework by exploiting an Islamic lens, explaining that "they call it human rightism, where the core beliefs are based on humanism and secularism as well as liberalism" and then adding that this is "deviationist in that it glorifies the desires of man alone and rejects any value system that encompasses religious norms and etiquettes" (Bystrova 2015) .
However, events and discourses perceived as Islamisation are not confined to political circles. In some cases, Islamisation is actually seen as Malaysia's Muslims increasingly looking to emulate life in the original Islamic world, and that what we see today as Islamisation may be better described as Arabisation. Indicators include the increasing use of tudung (headscarves) by Malay women and a move from traditional Malay dressing to perceivably Islamic dressing (Boo 2015) . 
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This has translated into discourses and events that can be seen as amounting to Malay-led 
